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1. Introduction
1 This paper explores the connections between Quine’s ontology and his philosophy of
science. I argue in favor of a view not widely shared among Quine scholars,1 a view
which lays emphasis on Quine’s alleged dictum, not to be found in print: “Philosophy of
science is philosophy enough.” If this is true where Quine is concerned, then its impact
on ontology should be brought to the fore. 
 
2. Metaontology
2 According to van Inwagen (2009: 506):
[Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment] is a proposal about the way in which
“philosophical disputes about what there is” should be conducted. (We might call
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them his “rules for conducting an ontological dispute.”) […] If these “rules” are not
followed, then – so say those of us who are adherents of Quine’s meta-ontology – it
is almost certain that many untoward consequences of the disputed positions will
be obscured by imprecision and wishful thinking.
3 For  van  Inwagen,  metaontology  is  a  branch  of  metaphysics  dealing  with  whether
ontological claims are justified, be they either positive (something exists) or negative
(something does not exist). Metaontology is also concerned with the extent to which
these questions can be raised, and whether there is a principled limit imposed by our
language policies (or the human mind’s capacities, etc.). 
4 Van Inwagen’s approach is representative for a host of philosophical disputes centering
around Quine’s notion of ontological commitment and how it saves philosophy from
the positivistic scruples manifest in, e.g., Carnap (1950). I will return to the question of
whether the debate between Quine and Carnap is correctly rendered. I would now like
to make two distinct points. 
5 The first point is that van Inwagen is correct in pointing out that, for a wide array of
ontologists, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment serves as the guiding rule in
conducting ontological disputes. This remark made by van Inwagen is both interesting
and important.  It  is  interesting because it  undercuts classical  ontological  endeavors
such as Heidegger’s, for which there is a difference between ontic claims (e.g., those
made by scientists) and ontological claims (those made by philosophers, perhaps those
especially  bent  toward  Heidegger’s  thought).  Quine’s  criterion  nullifies  such
differences. 
6 A second point,  one I  will  not  develop here,  since  it  has  been presented at  length
elsewhere,  is  that  van Inwagen’s  account  and related accounts  fail  to  do  justice  to
Quine’s  bent  toward  mathematics  and  the  natural  sciences.  Here  is  one  relevant
passage, owing to Isaacson (2006: 245, 263):
Quine  has  been  quoted  as  declaring  that  “philosophy  of  science  is  philosophy
enough” […] Peter Strawson attributes this declaration to Quine in Strawson 1982
(p. 12)  and Strawson 1990  (p. 310),  on  both  occasions  without  reference.  Robert
Cummins also attributes this declaration to Quine and uses it as the epigraph of his
book Meaning and Mental Representation (1990), also without reference. I have been
unable to locate this sentence in any of Quine’s publications, nor have a number of
Quine experts I  consulted. However, Strawson’s (1990) paper is published with a
comment by Quine (CS), and we may suppose that Quine would there have
demurred from this imputation to him had he found it alien. 
7 If naturalism is to be fully endorsed, as Quine seems to require, it ought to be somehow
connected with ontology as well. How is this connection to be achieved? This is the
question to which my paper sketches an answer. 
 
3. Language Policies and Reconstructions as Make-
Believe
8 Carnap and Quine are reputed for reviving the naturalist spirit of Mill after Frege and
Russell’s  philosophical  views  had  been  perceived  as  running  against  naturalism
(Laudan  1987).  Is  Quine’s  naturalism  a  heritage  from  Carnap?  And,  given  Carnap
anontologism, a position according to which ontological questions are meaningless, are
there consequently no possible connections between Quine’s naturalism (taken over
from  Carnap)  and  his  ontological  views  (different  from  Carnap’s  full  rejection  of
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ontology)?  More  generally,  how  is  their  common  concern  for  naturalism  to  be
reconciled with their differences where ontology is at stake? One unorthodox view on
the relation between Carnap and Quine comes from Price (2009: 322).
At least in part, then, the contemporary confidence and self-image of metaphysics
rests  on  a  conception  of  its  own  history  in  which  Quine  plays  a  central  role.
According to this  popular narrative,  it  was Quine –  perhaps Quine alone –  who
rescued metaphysics from positivism and other threats in those dark days after the
Second War (when the World itself seemed at risk). With one hand, Quine wrote
“On What There Is,”  and thus gave Ontology a life-saving transfusion. With the
other, he drove a stake through the heart of Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics and
Ontology” (Carnap 1950), and thus dispatched the last incarnation of the Viennese
menace [.]
9 I agree with most of Huw Price’s remarks, but want to suggest that Quine’s position is
more nuanced than presented by Price. What follows are two citations, one from Word
and Object, the other from “Epistemology Naturalized,” at a difference of 8-9 years. 
Carnap  has  long  held  that  the  questions  of  philosophy,  when  real  at  all,  are
questions of  language;  and the present observation would seem to illustrate his
point. He holds that the philosophical questions of what there is are questions of
how we may most conveniently fashion our “linguistic framework,” and not, as in
the case of the wombat or unicorn, questions about extralinguistic reality. He holds
that those philosophical questions are only apparently about sorts of objects, and
are really pragmatic questions of language policy.
But why should this be true of the philosophical questions and not of theoretical
questions generally? Such a distinction of status is of a piece with the notion of
analyticity  (§14),  and  as  little  to  be  trusted.  After  all,  theoretical  sentences  in
general are defensible only pragmatically; we can but assess the structural merits of
the  theory  which  embraces  them  along  with  sentences  directly  conditioned  to
multifarious stimulations. How then can Carnap draw a line across this theoretical
part and hold that the sentences this side of the line enjoy non-verbal content or
meaning in a way that those beyond the line do not? His own appeal to convenience
of linguistic framework allows pragmatic connections across the line. What other
sort  of  connection can be asked anywhere,  short  of  direct  conditioning to non-
verbal stimulations? (Quine 1960: 271)
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? The stimulation of
his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in
arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really
proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? (Quine 1969: 75)
10 At a first reading, these passages seem to go one against the other. In 1960, Quine seeks
to generalize Carnap’s view that ontological questions are questions of language policy
to all statements, observation sentences included. In 1969, Quine seems to change his
mind  and  declare  all  talk  of  rational  reconstruction  and  language  policy  as  an
uninspired metaphor, a piece of make-believe the theoretical usefulness of which is
doubtful  and  the  metaphysical  character  of  which  is  in  contradiction  with  a
commitment to naturalism. On this reading, we may interpret the difference in Quine’s
thought manifest in the passages drawn from his 1960 and 1969 as a change of mind
Quine may have had, as a more severe departure from Carnapian influences, and as a
move to a more radical naturalism, not present in Quine’s thought in 1960.
11 This  first  reading  seems  to  me  to  be  mistaken.  There  are  two  reasons  for  being
unsatisfied with this reading. First, it makes Quine change his mind on issues crucial to
his overall philosophical view, and if we can provide a more conservative picture of
Quine,  in  which  he  is  consistent  with  himself,  such  a  picture  seems  superior  on
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exegetical  grounds.  Secondly,  notwithstanding  the  emphasis  on  naturalism  laid  by
Quine in “Epistemology Naturalized,” there is no reason to suppose that anything in
Word and Object is  opposed to  it.  To suppose naturalism absent  in 1960 is  a  factual
mistake.
12 Before proposing my alternative reading of these two passages from Quine, I would like
to  give  due  credit  to  an  insight  present  in  this  first  interpretation,  namely  that,
according to Creath (2006: 61):
It could be argued that his preoccupation with reference and ontology generally
gave way to a greater concern for issues of an epistemic sort. 
 
4. Two Problems of Existence
13 My  reading  of  the  way  in  which  the  passages  cited  in  Section 3  may  be  seen  as
compatible is  to distinguish two problems of  existence,  a  semantic problem and an
epistemological problem of existence. The semantic problem of existence is this: how
can we express what we take there to exist, and what semantic decisions do our forms
of expression force upon us, if any? The epistemological problem of existence is this:
what criteria do we follow in deciding what we take there to exist, i.e., what are the
reliable sources of knowledge in which, in a naturalistic vein, we put our trust? Quine
will obviously want to appeal to science, which, fallible as it may be, is still our best
guide to learning about and interacting with the world. 
14 On  my  reading,  Quine’s  remark  in  1960  in  which  he  seeks  to  generalize  Carnap’s
thought applies to the semantic problem of existence, while his remark in 1969 serves
to delineate the epistemological problem. Concerning his remark in 1960, it becomes a
mere triviality to say that expressing existence by means of certain idioms rather than
others  is  a  question of  language policies.  The question is  no longer  trivial  when it
comes  to  deciding  on  special  cases,  such  as  names  without  bearers  or  negative
existentials (I will return to these below). Concerning Quine’s remark in 1969, it is again
short of trivial to say that deciding on existence in a naturalistic frame of mind is to
consider rational  reconstructions as instruments of  limited applicability and utility,
and to  complete  the picture concerning the scientific  endeavor with what  pertains
most  to  it,  a  scientific  study  of  science  itself,  appealing  to  all  relevant  sciences,
psychology being, of course, one of the sciences to which the appeal made would be the
most pertinent. 
15 It is well-known that Quine’s philosophy is a good example of how sharp distinctions,
such as the one between semantic questions and epistemic questions, are overcome. In
fact, the distinction I draw is not that sharp. All it takes is to see that, although the
answers  may  largely  overlap,  the  questions  themselves  are  separated  by  semantic
ascent. A nice illustration of this point, as of the difference between the semantic and
the  epistemological  problem of  existence  more  generally,  is  the  following  example
from “On What There Is” (Quine 1961: 16):
Translatability of a question into semantic terms is no indication that the question
is linguistic. To see Naples is to bear a name which, when prefixed to the words
“sees Naples,” yields a true sentence; still there is nothing linguistic about seeing
Naples. 
16 The distinction between expressing existence and deciding on existence, or,  for the
moment  equating  the  two,  the  distinction  between  the  semantic  and  the
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epistemological problem of existence, is not one I am bringing out for the first time.
One relevant Quine scholar is Alex Orenstein, from whose work I extract two relevant
passages:
Mastery of the mechanism of demonstrative singular terms and attributive general
terms does not make for reference to any new kinds of objects. (Orenstein 2005:
183)
[Quine is] expressing an ontology in terms of the science of logic. (Ibid.: 173)
17 Orenstein  (2005)  gives  due  consideration  to  the  distinction  between  expressing
existence  and  deciding  on  existence.  In  fact,  these  two  give  the  titles  of  separate
chapters in his monograph. The distinction is  also present in Orenstein (2004).  The
novelty of my paper lies not in introducing the distinction, but in putting a proper
emphasis  on  the  role  it  plays  in  the  interplay  between  Quine’s  ontology  and  his
philosophy of science. 
18 Given this distinction between expressing existence (roughly, the semantic problem)
and deciding on existence (roughly, the epistemological problem), the question with
which I started this paper, namely, what the relation between ontology and philosophy
of science is in Quine, can be rephrased by asking how solving the semantic problem
relates to solving the epistemological problem. 
 
5. Methodological Norms for Semantics
19 Does  expressing  existence  not  bring  along  some  semantic  decisions?  According  to
Orenstein, it does, since there are problematic cases such as the following:
(1) Pegasus is fond of green grass.
(2) A flying horse is smarter than reptiles.
(3) There is no bread left in the bakery.
(4) There is no flying horse.
20 These  sentences  are  problematic  because  we  cannot  be  said  to  be  ontologically
committed to objects whose existence is denied, as in negative existentials (3, 4), or to
putative referents  of  fictional  expressions,  also known as “names without bearers,”
such  as  “Pegasus”  or  “a  flying  horse.”  How  are  we  to  adjudicate between  rival
ontologies which differ precisely in how they solve these problematic cases?
21 Regardless of which particular set of solutions for (1-4) we choose, it is manifest that
semantic decisions have to be made, decisions on the basis of which the ontology of a
theory is to be clearly delineated. By what standards are these decisions to be made?
My suggestion is  that semantic decisions presuppose methodological  norms guiding
them. For example, I choose (4), which captures the problems present in (1-3) as well,
since it  contains both a name without a bearer and a negative existential.  (5-7) are
solutions given by Quine to (4). 
(5) “Flying horse” is an expression which is not satisfied by any n-tuple.
(6) It is not true that there is an x such that x is a horse and x can fly.
(7) For all x, x is a horse and x can fly if and only if x = Ø.
22 These solutions, compiled by Orenstein (1978) and Bencivenga (1986: 373-85), are not
the  only  solutions,  to  be  sure.  But  they  are  workable  solutions,  and  the  point  of
invoking  them  here  is  that  they  exemplify  the  methodological  presuppositions  of
Quine’s semantics:  these solutions satisfy the requirement of simplicity,  consistency
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(something cannot both exist and not exist) and the ontological norms of actuality and
literality (fictional characters don’t exist).
23 What  I  would  like  to  emphasize  is  not  the  extent  to  which  Quine’s  choice  of
methodology  is  appropriate  or  more  fruitful  than  its  rivals,  but  that  some
methodological choices generally underlie building up a semantics, and that Quine’s
philosophical views are a good example for how this might be done. Methodological
choices can be invoked as reasons for justifying certain semantic decisions, such as,
e.g., not allowing flying horses in one’s ontology. The mere inexistence of horses with
wings is not a logical matter; we have to look into the world and see that there are
none. In other words, the expression “flying horse” does not by itself tell us whether it
is satisfied by anything. We have to use this expression to make certain statements
about the world, statements which usually suppose a background theory in the light of
which they are evaluated as true or false. And this background theory is, as we might
expect any theory to be, guided by certain methodological rules, rules which are not
necessarily  prescribed  in  an  a  priori fashion,  but  are  read  off,  and  continuously
interacting with, the community of practicing scientists.
 
6. Yablo’s Critique of Quine
24 According to Stephen Yablo (1998: 258):
The goal of philosophical ontology is to determine what really exists. Leave out the
“really” and there’s no philosophy.
If metaphors are to be given special treatment, there had better be a way of telling
which statements the metaphors are. 
An obvious and immediate consequence is that the traditional ontological program
of believing in the entities to which our best theory is committed stands in need of
revision. The reason, again, is that our best theory may well include metaphorical
sentences (whose literal contents are) not meant to be believed. 
25 Yablo’s criticism against Quine is not exhausted by these citations, but these ones focus
on the same argument: since there is no criterion for distinguishing between literal
(uses of) sentences and metaphorical, or non-literal, (uses of) sentences, and since non-
literal sentences are not meant to carry ontological commitment, the project of reading
off ontological commitment from natural language sentences fails. 
26 There  are  several  lines  of  attack  against  this  argument.  I  will  first  list  several
objections, and them elaborate one of them.
(8) Why suppose Yablo is right, and not bite the bullet and claim our natural language
(its ontology included) is metaphorical? (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).
(9) Yablo does not account for the following intuition: “we do recognize a shift from
talk of objects to talk of words as debate progresses from existence of wombats and
unicorns to existence of points, miles, classes, and the rest” (Quine 1960: 271).
(10) Yablo’s remarks do not apply to formal languages, hence his charges do not apply
to Quine: if we read the existential quantifier as ontologically loaded, then whatever we
take there not to exist can be handled by means of semantic ascent.
(11) Does Yablo wish to imply ontology ought to be intuitive, or necessarily read off
natural language?
27 The most important of these charges seems to me to be the third, (10). Yablo’s remarks,
if correct (and we need not assume that they are correct), apply to ordinary language,
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spoken by competent speakers;  they do not apply to formal languages.  Contrary to
Yablo’s  intentions,  his  conclusions  concerning  the  impossibility  of  reading  off
ontological commitments from natural language discourse is in agreement with Quine’s
choice of a formal language off which to read commitments, as well as with Quine’s
thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, which it may be interpreted as supporting.2
Here is a relevant passage from Quine (1961: 106).
[I]t  is  only  […]  in  reference  to  one  or  another  real  or  imagined  logical
schematization  of  one  or  another  part  or  all  of  science,  that  we  can  with  full
propriety inquire into ontological presuppositions. The philosophical devotees of
ordinary language are right in doubting the final adequacy of any criterion of the
ontological presuppositions of ordinary language, but they are wrong in supposing
that  there  is  no  more  to  be  said  on  the  philosophical  question  of  ontological
presuppositions. 
 
7. “There is” and an Interpretive Puzzle
28 There are three Quinean claims concerning the phrase “there is” which seem to be in
conflict with one another. 
29 The first claim is that natural language provides us with the phrase “there is,” which
Quine says was the original in accordance with which the existential quantifier was
codified in standard logic. 
Some may protest, however, that the quantifier “(∃x)” […] says nothing of entities
nor  of  existence;  that  the  meaning  of  the  so-called  existential  quantification  is
completely described merely by the logical rules which govern it. Now I grant that
the  meaning  of  quantification  is  covered  by  the  logical  rules;  but  the  meaning
which those rules determine is still that which ordinary usage accords to the idioms
“there is an entity such that,” “an entity exists such that” etc. Such conformity was
the  logistician’s  objective  when  he  codified  quantification;  existential
quantification was designed for the role of those common idioms. (Quine 1966: 65)
30 The second claim is Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, according to which
“[t]o be is to be a value of a variable” (Quine 1966: 66). A third claim Quine makes is
that ontologizing in natural language is impossible, and was cited above when rejecting
Yablo’s objections.
31 But here is  the initial  puzzle.  Don’t  the three claims conflict?  In particular,  if  the
existential  quantifier  faithfully  translates  “there  is”  into  canonical  notation,  then,
given that to be is to be a value of an existentially bound variable, shouldn’t it also be
the case that to be is to be designated by an expression prefixed by the phrase “there
is”? If so, wouldn’t this amount to saying that natural language is not misfit for reading
ontology off its “there is” claims? 
32 A plausible answer concerns the phrase “faithfully translates” which appears in the
previous  paragraph.  If  indeterminacy  of  translation  applies  in  the  case  of
regimentation, then there can be no such thing as faithful translation, inasmuch as
“where there is one translation, there are many” possible incompatible translations
from natural language into or onto standard first-order logic (Quine 1969). 
33 In order to substantiate this claim, any one of two things is required. One thing is to
provide translations of “there is” which differ from the existential quantifier. A second
thing is to provide translations of the existential quantifier which differ from “there
is.” 
Quine’s Ontology
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34 In  what  concerns  the  existential  quantifier,  I  would  like  to  mention  at  least  two
alternatives  to  the  objectual  reading  of  the  existential  quantifier  which  Quine
advocates.  One  such  view  is  Carnap’s  anontologism  (1950),  according  to  which  an
ontology read off a language (be it natural language or a formalization thereof) is an
answer  to  a  nonsensical  question.  The  question  concerning  the  relation  between
Carnap and Quine’s views on ontology is too important to be dealt with here, but prima
facie,  the  common perception of  the  dispute  between the  two is  that  Quine  deems
ontologizing  as  a  viable  question  worth  pursuing,  a  question  that  naturally
accompanies  the  scientific  enterprise,  while  Carnap deems ontology meaningless,  a
remnant of  the metaphysics he had been trying to dispense with since his  (Carnap
1932/1959). 
35 Another such view is a substitutional interpretation of quantification such as the one
envisaged  by  Kripke  (1976).  Kripke  is  at  pains  to  emphasize  that  a  substitutional
quantification is  not devoid of ontological  commitments.  Such commitments are,  in
turn, commitments to linguistic entities.
36 If  we recall  the Naples example,  in which a trip to a foreign city is  no particularly
linguistic activity, we can see that, irrespective of whether substitutional quantification
does have ontological  commitments or not,  these widely differ  from what ordinary
competent speakers would take their words to be referring to. The use of substitutional
quantification or of mixed objectual and substitutional quantification remains an open
alternative, especially  for  reinterpreting  formalized  theories,  but  it  is  defeated  by
considerations of intuitiveness in what concerns its application to verbal reports of
ordinary speakers.
37 What about the possibility of translating sentences comprising “there is” otherwise
than by sentential  formulae comprising an existential  quantifier? There are several
sorts of examples that are relevant in this context. Consider the following statements.
(12) I quit my job, and that is all there is to it.
(13) Being is what there is, what has being exists but is not. 
(14) This is an example concerning the phrase “there is.”
38 These examples undermine the idea that “there is” should uniformly be translated as
the  existential  quantifier.  (12)  comprises  the  phrase  “all  there  is  to  it,”  a  saying
carrying no ontological load. (12) may perhaps be seen as a rhetorical device. In (14)
“there is” is mentioned and not used hence is, according to Quine, referentially opaque
(Quine 1960).
39 (13) deserves a brief discussion. It is a mark of the distinction one could make between
being and existence, in the manner of Meinong or Heidegger. Quine’s opposition to
such  an  existence  is  manifold.  (a)  First,  there  is  Quine’s  second  claim  cited  above
according to which the existential  quantifier  codifies  “there is.”  This  claim may be
denied  by  producing  counterexamples,  or  by  advancing a  completely  different
hypothesis,  such  as  that  there  are  principially  different  uses  of  “there  is,”  one
corresponding to existence, and the other to being.
40 (b) Secondly, Quine opposes such an ontological distinction, which he also identifies as
an ontological consequence of both type theories and Carnap’s linguistic frameworks,
in view of what van Inwagen (2009) has called “the univocality of being.” Consider a
simple example. There are objects with which we can causally interact; for instance, I
causally interact with a cup of coffee every morning. However, there also are abstract
Quine’s Ontology
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objects, with which we don’t interact, objects the existence of which we posit in order
to make true certain statements the truth of which we are persuaded. Is causal efficacy
a criterion with respect to which we could divide all there is into two, and say that
there are two meanings to “there is,” one amounting to causal interaction, the second
amounting to theoretical utility? Quine takes a different stand. According to him, as
long as we have the predicates “causally efficacious” and “theoretically useful” in our
language, there is no need to make “there is” ambiguous; we can let it be true of what
each of the predicates is true of taken indiscriminately. 
41 The  most  serious  challenges  remain  those  posed  by  names  without  bearers  and
negative  existentials.  Traditionally,  the  intuitive  point  of  negative  existentials  is  to
deny existence (ontologically read), not to affirm it.  This is not the proper place to
discuss the way Quine attempts to solve these problems. (I have suggested in Section 5
that Quine’s solutions to these problems, and, more generally, that any solutions to
these problems, are methodologically loaded.) What I would like to stress in this section
is that Quine’s solutions have the advantage of keeping the quantificational idiom as
the  formal  device  that  best  captures  the  use  of  “there  is”  once  rhetorical  and
metaphysical  uses  are  either  paraphrased  away  or  ignored  as  irrelevant  for  the
scientific enterprise within which, and to the benefit of which, Quine devised his notion
of ontological commitment by means of bound variables.
42 It thus seems that there are at least two types of cases in which semantic decision is in
order: first, the puzzles in (1-4) in Section 5, and then the rhetorical, metaphysical or
conversational uses of “there is” present in (12-14) in this section. These two types of
cases  suggest  that  we  cannot  equate  the  problem  of  expressing  existence  and  the
semantic problem of existence. In addition to how we decide to express existence (for
Quine, this is done in standard logic by means of the quantificational idiom), we also
have to decide how we deal with the problematic cases (1-4) and (12-14) and others like
them. Semantic decision is  inextricably interwoven with expressing what things we
take there to exist, and expressing existence always calls for certain local decisions as
to what to allow or disallow from the ontology we commit ourselves to. 
43 Well,  finally,  how  are  the  three  claims  with  which  I  started  this  section  to  be
reconciled?  On  the  one  hand,  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  prohibits  an
unambiguous meaning codified both in the existential  quantifier and in the English
expression “there is.” On the other hand, as (Routley 1966, 1982) correctly points out,
Quine identifies existence and objecthood, thus denying Routley’s Meinongian claim:
“some things do not exist.” As expected, there is no simple answer as to how the three
claims Quine makes can be reconciled. The beginning of the answer can, I believe, be
identified in the following lines from Quine (1981: 9). 
The common man’s ontology is vague and untidy. […] Should we regard grammar as
decisive?  Does  every  noun  demand  some  array  of  denotata?  Surely  not;  the
nominalizing of verbs is often a mere stylistic variation. But where should we draw
the line? It is a wrong question; there is no line to draw. […] We must recognize this
grading off for what it is, and recognize that a fenced ontology is just not implicit in
ordinary language. […] Ontological concern is not a correction of a lay thought and
practice; it is foreign to the lay culture, though an outgrowth of it.
44 What this passage suggests is that the difficulty of reconciling the three claims lies not
in Quine’s reflections on natural language, but in the workings of that language itself.
Ordinary speech is not fit for ontologizing, and it has to be regimented, i.e., translated
into standard logic, before it can be used as an adequate tool by the ontologist. This is
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not necessarily a fault of ordinary speech. Our mother tongue may have developed as it
has in order to accommodate certain needs and interests of the community of speakers,
interests which are different from and perhaps contrary to ontological transparency. 
 
8. Epistemological Primacy: Truth or Reference? 
45 If ontology is necessarily connected to semantics, then a choice of semantics is in order.
Quine’s  choice is  Tarskian semantics (Quine 1992).  This  choice itself  is  not immune
from  epistemological  intrusion.  Quine  justifies  the  choice  of  Tarskian  semantics  as
opposed  to,  for  example,  Kripke’s  account  of  truth,  by  appealing  to  the  norm  of
systematicity of human knowledge as a whole (e.g., Quine’s reply to Ullian in Garret
and Gibson 1993).
46 Tarskian semantics, though necessary by Quine’s lights, is not enough for ontologizing.
First of all, the semantics has to be interpreted as providing formal counterparts of the
ordinary  language  notions  of  truth,  reference  and  definability.  Secondly,  Tarski’s
definition of truth by means of satisfaction provides a clear semantic relation between
truth and reference as ordinarily conceived, but is this semantic relation connected to
anything in the world? In other words, Tarski’s definition of truth leads to solving the
semantic  problem  of  existence,  but  it  says  nothing  about  how  the  epistemological
problem of existence might be solved. 
47 How does  Tarskian semantics  help  solve  the  semantic  problem of  existence?  In  an
intuitive way, Tarski’s definition of truth by means of satisfaction allows Quine to say
that we are committed to the existence of those objects that make true the sentences in
which the expressions referring to them occur.3 The semantic problem of existence is
solved by (i) working within Tarskian semantics; (ii) identifying existence, objecthood
and reference; and (iii) making the kinds of decisions required by the cases alluded to
in Sections 5 and 7. 
48 By way of  contrast,  the epistemological  problem can be rephrased in the following
manner:  where  should  epistemology  be  looked  for?  Do  the  findings of  science
determine what sequences of objects exist, or what sentences the scientific community
holds as true? Of course, this dilemma may seem far-fetched: once we have one, we are
bound to have the other as well. Nevertheless, there is room for philosophical debate,
and I will focus on two contemporary philosophers who have illustrated this debate:
Quine and P.F. Strawson. Before entering in a more detailed account of their views, I
think  their  positions  could  be  summarized  as  follows:  Quine  gives  epistemological
primacy to truth, while Strawson gives epistemological primacy to reference. Strawson
is quite clear on what his stand is; here follow three such statements on his part.
This identificatory task is characteristically the task of the definite singular term.
(Strawson 1968: 399) 
So  our  theoretical  grasp  of  the  nature  of  canonical  notation  rests  upon  our
theoretical grasp of the identificatory function of singular terms. (Ibid.: 403)
Of course, statements and facts fit. They were made for each other. (Strawson 1950:
137)
49 Strawson is a redundancy-theorist of truth, as witnessed by the third citation. On a
narrower reading, this means that Ramsey equivalences are all there is to know about
truth (p ↔ p is true ↔ it is true that p is true, etc.). According to an updated version,
truth need not be explicitly defined by satisfaction; we can settle for a partial definition
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of  truth by means of  instances of  the T-Convention (Horwich 1990).  But  if truth is
redundant, it is barred from playing any significant role in epistemology. So this role is
given to reference, as witnessed by the first two citations from Strawson.
50 How  about  Quine?  The  principle  of  context,  according  to  which  an  expression  is
meaningful only in the context of a sentence in which it appears, is for Quine one of the
milestones of empiricism (Quine 1981). Truth is not only semantically relevant; it is,
first and foremost, epistemologically relevant. 
 
9. Strawson’s Objections to Quine. What is the
Rationale of Commitment?
51 One  of  the  most  cunning  pieces  of  critique  brought  against  Quine’s  notion  of
ontological commitment (in my opinion, at least) is the following.
Of course there is  a link between the two senses of “object.” For objects in the
ontological-categorial sense are the basic objects in the logico-grammatical sense.
Hard  though  it  is  to  believe,  it  is  almost  impossible  not  to  believe  that  some
confusion of  the two senses of  “object,”  or of  the two ideas involved,  underlies
much  of  the  persistent  philosophical  anxiety  that  goes  under  the  name  of
“ontology.” The confusion would seem too gross to be credible if it were not for the
fact  that  in  philosophy no confusion is  too  gross  to  be  credible.  Worries  about
Platonism; the talk of  “countenancing” items of  this  or that type or “admitting
them into our ontology”; the use of phrases like “a grossly inflated ontology” and
the rest – all of these are familiar in connection with quantification into subject-
place, and the connection is very difficult to understand except on the supposition
of  some  such  confusion  and  quite  easy  to  understand  on  that  supposition.
(Strawson 2000: 78) 
52 Formulations. Strawson’s  challenge  is  not  altogether  clear.  I  will  attempt  two
formulations.  On  the  one  hand,  the  criticism seems  negative,  undermining  Quine’s
empiricism by means of a reductio, basically saying you can’t have both empiricism and
a semantic conception of existence. On the other hand, Strawson’s remarks may also
receive a positive formulation, according to which Quine would exhibit some sort of
linguistic idealism, couched by Strawson in the telling label “Platonistic myths.” 
53 Reply to the negative formulation. As usual, there are replies to both ways of raising
the  issue.  Against the  negative  side  of  the  objection,  one  suggesting  there  is  an
incompatibility between empiricism and a semantic conception of existence, one may
retort that, formulated in the idiom of semantics for the canonical notation, the old
metaphysical  project  is  ambiguous.  Its  heirs  are  ontology  and  ideology,  where  the
ontology  of  a  theory  couched  in  standard  logic  is  nothing  but  the  domain  of
interpretation in a model. Strictly speaking, the ideology of such a theory is the set of
predicates needed in the vocabulary to build up the statements comprising the theory.
However,  one  may  also  comprise,  by  the  term  “ideology,”  definitions  and  axioms
needed to supply the theoretical identification of one set of objects with another. As
Quine repeatedly emphasizes, there is room for ontological decision in that a trade-off
between ontology and ideology (in the second sense) is always possible.
54 A simple example for the trade-off between ontology and ideology is the definition of
number. We can either assume that there are natural numbers (i.e., abstract objects
having certain desirable properties and which are not sets)  or we may identify the
sequence of natural numbers with a certain sequence of sets in the manner of Frege,
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Zermelo or von Neumann. A definition of number in the sense of this second choice
allows us to dispense of our previous commitment to numbers and to get by only with
commitment  to  the  sets  with  which  they  are  identified.  This  ontological  gain  is,
nonetheless,  counterbalanced by  a  loss  in  theoretical  simplicity,  since  an inductive
definition (say, (∀n)(n ∈ N* ↔ n = {n-1}) ) and an explicit definition (say, 0 = Ø) have
been added. 
55 Given the possibility of this trade-off, one can reply, as Quine does, that empiricism is a
question concerning what predicates are to be admitted in one’s vocabulary, while the
semantic conception of existence is concerned with what elements the domain of a
model comprises. Quine can thus justify an intuitively plausible result, namely, that
there  is  no  conflict  between  empiricism  and  Tarskian  semantics:  semantics  is
concerned with what there is (ontology), and empiricism is concerned with how we
describe what there is (general epistemology). 
56 Reply to the positive formulation. Perhaps Strawson rejects the idea that what there
is can be subjected to ontological decision. This, at least, seems to be suggested by his
rejection of the vocabulary comprised of “countenancing” or “accepting” entities into
one’s  ontology.  Indeed,  Quine’s  favorite  examples  are  choosing between alternative
definitions of number, or between alternative axiomatizations of set theory, or between
wave  mechanics  and  particle  mechanics  etc.,  and  it  may  be  argued  that  all  these
decisions are at too high a level of generality to bear on the important and intuitively
accessible problems of classical metaphysics: what reality is, what there is. It is obvious
that  these  questions  have  preoccupied  humankind long  before  these  theories  were
available to us and that naturalizing ontological talk to a semantical or methodological
evaluation of such theories might be charged with missing the point.
57 In brief, Strawson’s charges are in fact two, which blend in the expression “linguistic
idealism.”  One  part  corresponds  to  semantics,  and  it  is  this  part  which  Strawson
addresses with his expression “Platonistic myths,” and the other part corresponds to
empiricism, and it is this part that Strawson addresses when rejecting the vocabulary of
“countenancing entities.”
58 But Strawson’s remarks seem to presuppose that reality is out there, independent of
our making,  and immune to ontological  decision.  In addition,  this  reality is  inaptly
characterized as being the end-result of countenancing entities, so it also seems there
are proper ways of speaking about reality and improper ways of doing so. Such a view
roughly  corresponds  to  a  metaphysics  which  associates  one  privileged  language
(typically,  natural language) with one world which the language in question merely
expresses,  describes  or  depicts,  but  never  changes  or  mixes  with,  in  a  conceptual
scheme. I believe Strawson’s objection can be challenged by saying that this is by far a
more  genuine  brand  of  Platonism  than  Quine’s.  Contrary  to  the  traditional
metaphysical  view  presented  in  this  paragraph,  Quine  is  both  a  linguistic  and  an
ontological reconstructivist (in the terminology of Carrara & Varzi 2001). Whether this
position falls prey to other kind of objections than Strawson’s, the particular objection
formulated in the beginning of this section fails. 
 
10. Pursuing Truth
59 There are a number of well-known Quinean arguments in favor of the epistemological
primacy of truth and against the epistemological primacy of reference. Quine’s thesis of
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ontological  relativity  (1969),  or  global  structuralism  (1992)  is  one  of  them.  Quine’s
thesis  of  the  inscrutability  of  reference  is  another  such  doctrine.  I  will  not  try  to
evaluate  the  extent  to  which  these  theses  are  plausible  or  even  true,  but  only  to
speculate on the role they play in Quine’s thought. In the light of the previous sections,
it seems to me that these theses are negative theses, but that their import is negative
only in what concerns the epistemological primacy of reference. In other words, what
these theses tell us is that we cannot look into what exists except by looking into which
theories of natural sciences are true and which are false. If Quine can both reject the
objection  coming  from  Strawson  and  analyzed  in  Section 9,  and  make  a  case  for
ontological relativity, for instance, then truth is what connects theories to the world,
and not the putative referents of theoretical terms, which are a mere by-product of
applying  semantics  to  theories  understood  as  sets  of  true  sentences  closed  under
logical consequence.4 
60 But  here  comes  another  puzzle:  how  can  the  epistemological  primacy  of  truth  be
reconciled with Quine’s disquotationalism? Quine does claim, along with Tarski (1956),
that Convention T is a criterion for the material adequacy of any definition of truth.
And Quine (1992: 93) goes on to say that any non-semantic talk of truth is gibberish:
Pilate was probably not the first to ask what truth is, and he was by no means the
last.  Those who ask it  seek something deeper than disquotation,  which was the
valid residue of the correspondence theory of truth (§ 33). Yet there is surely no
impugning the disquotation account; no disputing that “Snow is white” is true if
and only if snow is white. Moreover, it is a full account: it explicates clearly the
truth  or  falsity  of  every  clear  sentence.  It  is  even a  more  than full  account:  it
imposes a requirement on the truth predicate that is too strong for any predicate
within the language concerned – on pain of contradiction [.]
61 If truth is purely disquotational, then it would seem it cannot play the epistemological
role I ascribed to it in the preceding sections. I believe, however, that the two positions
can be reconciled, and that the key lies in the way the passage cited above continues:
There are  recurrent  references  to  a  coherence theory of  truth,  or  a  pragmatist
theory of truth. The question that motivates this quest beyond disquotation can
perhaps be phrased thus: if to call a sentence true is simply to affirm it, then how
can we tell whether to affirm it?
The lazy answer is “That all depends on what the sentence is. In the case of ‘Snow is
white’ you just look at snow and check the color.” The more sympathetic answer is
general analysis of the grounds of warranted belief, hence scientific method […] 
Truth is one thing, warranted belief another. We can gain clarity and enjoy the
sweet simplicity of two-valued logic by heeding the distinction. (Quine 1992: 93-4)
62 What  this  text  seems  to  suggest  is  that  truth  and  warranted  belief  are,  ideally,
coextensive notions. It is as if scientists were preoccupied with warranting beliefs, and
those  beliefs  which fared better  were  declared true.  When scientists  changed their
minds (e.g.,  due to the falsification of a theory),  the sentence is  question would no
longer be warranted, and the noble tag of truth would thereby be withdrawn. 
63 How does this position solve the epistemological problem of existence? First, given the
epistemological primacy of truth, finding out which statements (which theories) are
true automatically yields what there is (once the semantic machinery has been brought
to bear). Secondly, this is a purely epistemic criterion concerning which sentences are
true:  the warranted beliefs.  Thirdly,  this  epistemic criterion is  just  a  criterion,  and
truth  receives  a  purely  semantic  analysis  along  the  lines  of  Tarski:  Quine  is  not
committed to an epistemic notion of truth such as coherence or the ideal of inquiry.
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64 There are several comments to be made about this position. First, a historical point:
Quine was not prone to talk about warrant.5 If we are concerned with the evolution of
Quine’s  thought  rather  than with  the  positions  he  had come to  see  as  satisfactory
towards  the  end  of  his  philosophical  career,  perhaps  the  connection  between  the
epistemological  and  the  semantic  problem  of  existence  ought  to  receive  a  slightly
different account. I will not explore this suggestion any further. 
65 Secondly,  the  notion  of  warrant  that  Quine  uses  does  not  receive  any  particular
analysis. I am not committed to any such particular analysis, but the following section
sketches two ways in which this notion could be made a little more precise in what
concerns Quine’s approach to the philosophy of science.
 
11. How Scientific Practice and Methodological Rules
Decide on What There is
66 According to Price (1992: 406):
On  one  reading,  the  Quinean  doctrine  is  effectively  a  principle  of  ontological
quietism – the principle that there is no separate second-order science of ontology,
but simply the mundane business of existential quantification carried out by first-
order specialists in the course of their working lives.
67 This is the reading Huw Price favors, although it is not altogether clear whether his
remarks are meant to say that this is the way Quine would have had it, or that Quine
was mistaken in thinking otherwise that Price. A second reading, one Price dislikes, but
which I believe suits Quine better, is depicted in what follows on the same page:
There seems to be a tendency to read the Quinean doctrine in quite a different way,
however. Under this second reading, the activities of first-order specialists provide
raw data  to  which the Quinean principle  is  then applied,  yielding second-order
ontological conclusions. In other words, the fact that first-order specialists quantify
over the entities of a certain kind is held to constitute evidence that such entities
actually exist. Far from dismissing the science of ontology, Quine’s doctrine thus
becomes the main instrument in the working ontologist’s tool kit – a kind of “magic
eye” for detecting otherwise invisible existents. 
68 I  will  not  quarrel  with  the  magic  kit  Price  mentions,  as  it  is  much  too  familiar  a
phenomenon that, as Quine (1981: 9) puts it, “ontological concern is foreign to the lay
culture.” But beyond a certain rhetorical flair, it seems to me that Price provides no
serious argument against the possibility that methodological considerations of a far
greater degree of generality than any specific scientific finding may indeed play a role
in deciding what theories to hold as warranted, hence true, hence indicative of what
there is. 
69 In order to flesh out this intuition, I employ Lakatos’ terminology. I do this in spite of
Lakatos’ criticisms of Quine, since I doubt both the accuracy of these criticisms, and
that, if they were to be reckoned as true, they applied at all to those aspects of Quine
epistemology with which we are concerned in this section.6 In line with Quine’s view
that existence depends on truth, Lakatos (1989: 96) rejects the claim that that sort of
metaphysics which is different in kind from methodology should carry any weight in
assessing scientific theories.
By metaphysics  he [Popper]  meant syntactically  specifiable statements like “all-
some”  statements  and  purely  existential  statements.  No  basic  statements  could
conflict with them because of their logical form. For instance, “for all metals there
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is  a  solvent”  would,  in  this  sense,  be  “metaphysical,”  while  Newton’s  theory of
gravitation,  taken  in  isolation,  would  not  be.  […]  I  go  much  further  than  they
[Agassi,  Watkins]  in  blurring the demarcation between [Popper’s]  “science” and
[Popper’s] “metaphysics.”7 I do not even use the term “metaphysical” anymore. I
only talk about scientific research programmes whose hard core is irrefutable not
necessarily because of syntactical but possibly because of methodological reasons
which have nothing to do with logical form. 
70 Are  Quine’s  views  in  agreement  with  Lakatos?  To  a  great  extent  yes,  but  not
completely. Quine stresses the importance of several norms guiding and regulating the
appraisal  of  scientific  theories:  conservatism,  modesty,  simplicity,  generality,
refutability (Quine & Ullian 1978: 39-50).
71 However,  it  seems  that  the  citation  from  Lakatos  condemns  the  translation  of
metaphysical questions into syntactic terms, and Quine’s dictum, “to be is to be a value
of  a  bound  variable,”  seems  to  presuppose  exactly  such  a  syntactic  view.  This
appearance is deceiving. Although crediting Popper for popularizing fallibilism (1990:
V),  Quine  never  endorses  a  criterion  of  demarcation,  so  he  does  not  identify
metaphysics as a separate domain of human activity with which he would consequently
be at pains to dispense with. The syntactic view used by Popper to back up his criterion
of demarcation does not thereby apply to Quine as well.
72 For Quine,  “there is  no first  philosophy” (1969),  and further inquiry into what this
means is fruitful only inasmuch as scientific results can, in a naturalistic framework, be
used  to  study  the  scientific  phenomenon  itself.  Lakatos’  ceasing  to  use  the  term
“metaphysical”  is  in  full  agreement  with  Quine,  who  declares:  “Structure  is  what
matters to a theory, and not the choice of its objects.” (Quine 1981: 20).
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NOTES
1. The story behind the dictum attributed to Quine that I mention below is recounted by Isaacson
(2006). In saying my interpretation of Quine is not widely shared among Quine scholars, I mean to
point to the differences between interpreting Quine as a forerunner of, say, work done by Paul
and Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett, and the Quine from whom Peter van Inwagen and
other  avowed  metaphysicians  take  inspiration.  To  be  sure,  Quine  is  the  one  and  the  same
philosopher.  But  metaphysicians  and  philosophers  of  science  emphasize  different  aspects  of
Quines’  views.  Gibson (1980)  is  a  useful  early  discussion of  attempting to  reconcile  different
strands of Quine’s overall outlook. See also the discussion of Huw Price’s reassessment of the
literature in Section 3 below.
2. Yablo offers the argument coming from his criterion of literality to rebut Quine’s allegedly
analogous  argument  against  Carnap’s  conventionalism  in  the  philosophy  of  mathematics.
Nothing I have said favors either Quine or Carnap in that naturalistic debate.
3. Strictly speaking, this is not a proper account of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment,
since it does not discriminate between Quine and those claiming that existence supervenes on
truth (e.g.,  Schaffer 2008), nor between Quine and Orenstein (2004), who offers a criterion of
ontological commitment according to which to be is to make true an (affirmative) elementary
sentence. These discriminations are downplayed because they do not influence the course of the
argument made in this paper.
4. It may be urged that Quine’s concept of what a scientific theory is has changed over time,
getting closer to a semantic view of scientific theories. This may be true, but nothing essential of
what I say in the paper would thereby have to be modified.
5. I owe this comment to Alvin Goldman.
6. The claim I want to make is that Lakatos’ views give a distinctively clear formulation of both a
weak variant of holism and a weak variant of naturalism. Concerning holism, Lakatos is at pains
to  criticize  the  allegedly  conventionalist  view  of  Duhem  and  Quine.  As  “Epistemology
Naturalized” suggests, this is a far cry from Quine’s actual thought. Again, Lakatos argues against
an  all-encompassing  holism,  as  being  incompatible  with  multiple  competing  research
programmes. But Quine and Ullian (1978) argue that the unit of cognitive significance need not
be the whole of our language or knowledge, but a large part thereof. If we consider research
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programmes in  areas  which are  basic  enough for  research so  as  to  provide  the  background
theories of various special sciences, this concession is enough to make many aspects of Lakatos’
account apply to Quine’s views as well.
7. The last two interpolations belong to Lakatos’ editors. 
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